Bioethics, Complementarity, and Corporate Criminal Liability by Long, Ryan
(open	access	version)	
Published	in	International	Criminal	Law	Review	(2017)	
https://doi.org/10.1163/15718123-01703004	
 
Bioethics, Complementarity, and Corporate Criminal Liability 
Ryan Long 
Philadelphia University 
Abstract 
This article provides a brief introduction to some contemporary 
challenges found in the intersection of bioethics and international 
criminal law involving genetic privacy, organ trafficking, genetic 
engineering, and cloning. These challenges push us to re-evaluate 
the question of whether the international criminal law should hold 
corporations criminally liable. I argue that a minimalist and 
Strawsonian conception of corporate responsibility could be useful 
for deterring the wrongs outlined in first few sections and in 
answering compelling objections to corporate criminal liability.  
Keywords 
bioethics; complementarity; corporate responsibility; corporate 
criminal liability; international criminal law; ICC (International 
Criminal Court) 
 
1 Introduction 
This article provides a brief introduction to some contemporary 
challenges found in the intersection of bioethics and international 
law involving genetic privacy, organ trafficking, engineering, and 
cloning. Some forms of harm involving genetic material and 
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information are divorced from location, making new types of 
international crimes possible. For example, misuse of genetic 
samples or information can cause harm without any physical 
incursion to a foreign state or victim’s body. These harms, as well as 
harms dealing with cloning, genetic engineering, and organ 
trafficking, often involve (or would likely involve) corporations. 
These challenges push us to re-evaluate the question of whether the 
international criminal law should hold corporations criminally 
liable. 
Human rights discourse and bioethics both ascended after World 
War II. In bioethics there has been a transition from focus on 
Hippocratic beneficence to individual rights and autonomy. Rather 
than understanding moral obligations to patients and the public 
solely in terms of the practitioner’s expert opinion on what would 
increase their well-being, other principles such as autonomy, justice, 
informed consent, and confidentiality became prominent. These 
principles can trump welfarist concerns. Likewise, the human rights 
approach has become a prominent feature of international law. This 
increased role of rights in both international law and bioethics is a 
promising precedent for the international criminal law. As Andorno 
observes, ‘[t]he enterprise of setting common standards in the 
biomedical field, although difficult, is possible because international 
human rights law presupposes that some basic principles transcend 
cultural diversity’.1 Human dignity is one of the transcendent 
principles. The approach of this paper denies legal positivism’s 
separation thesis that morality is external to law. The correct 
interpretation of existing laws, and the status of written law as law, 
cannot be entirely insulated from morality. Transcendent moral 
principles have a role to play within law. A prolonged discussion of 
the separation thesis is beyond the scope of this article. I work within 
the integrated approach to international law recently defended in this 
journal.2  
This approach allows bioethics to take a more prominent role in 
																																								 																				
1 Roberto Andorno, ‘Biomedicine and international human rights law: in search of a global 
consensus’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 80(12) (2002) 959. 
2 Anja Matwijkiw, ‘Introduction: Ethics in the Making–From Controversy to Criterion for 
International Criminal Law’, International Criminal Law Review 16(12) (2016) 177-200. 
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international criminal law. Of course the international arena already 
includes the unanimously adopted soft law UNESCO Declarations 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997), the International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003), and the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005). The Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (1997), 
commonly known as the Oviedo Convention, has been cited many 
times by the European Court of Human Rights.3 In what follows I 
will argue for an increased role for bioethics both in international 
criminal law sensu stricto and what may more aptly fall under the 
category of transnational criminal law [TCL].4 
Genetics and biotechnology make possible new forms of 
international wrongs. These may be new species of types of wrongs 
already criminalized by the international law, or may be entirely new 
and call for new laws. Misuse of genetic material or information can 
harm an individual from any location. My genetic material or 
information can be transmitted to parties in other countries who can 
then violate my privacy and autonomy. There is no necessary 
physical connection between the harmed party and the offender. A 
party in one state can harm someone in another without any 
incursion of the nation or, for that matter, the body. This does not 
match the character of the war crimes and human rights violations 
																																								 																				
3 For examples, see Costa and Pavan v. Italy App no 54270/10 (ECtHR, 28 August 2012);  Evans 
v.  the United Kingdom ECHR 2007-I 353. For illuminating discussion of both cases see Francesco 
Seatzu and Simona Fanni, `The Experience of the European Court of Human Rights with 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine’, Utrecht J. Int'l & Eur. L. 
31 (2015) 5. 
4 Boister argues for an emerging conception of transnational criminal law (and its 
suppression treaties) that is distinct from international criminal law and domestic criminal 
law. His argument considers several factors but we can focus on the normative case for 
distinguishing TCL. Transnational criminal laws involve norms that are different from 
the norms underpinning fully international crimes like genocide because `the threat 
suppressed is not sufficiently serious to engage a sufficient consensus in international 
society to use ICL to suppress it’. Of course, on this view TCL is still based in shared 
norms. `TCL is to suppress inter- and intra-state criminal activity that threatens shared 
national interests or cosmopolitan values’. It uses conventions and treaties to project 
substantive criminal norms beyond national boundaries. Bassiouni, on the other hand, 
considers this sort of TCL to be part of ICL. See M.C. Bassiouni,  ‘The Sources and 
Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Framework’, in International 
Criminal Law (Transnational Publishers, 1999); see N. Boister, `Transnational criminal 
law?’, European Journal of International Law 14(5) (2003) 953-976. 
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that shape our conception of international criminal law, such as the 
human experimentation atrocities of World War II. These new sorts 
of harms often (or the hypothetical harms of human cloning and 
human reproductive genetic engineering likely would) involve 
multinational entities or corporations and are difficult to fully 
address through merely domestic means. 
This article first considers three possible reasons that bioethics 
should play a greater role in international criminal law. First, 
contemporary bioethics addresses wrongs that might already qualify 
as international crimes when the law is interpreted properly. With an 
interpretive approach, these wrongs become a proper focus on 
international criminal law. Second, contemporary bioethics 
identifies wrongs (and potential wrongs) that warrant new 
international criminal laws. Harms involving DNA privacy, cloning, 
and genetic engineering of humans may require new international 
laws. In consideration of these two options I provide evidence from 
the current literature. The third option leads to my original 
contribution. International criminal law could be an effective tool (or 
the necessary tool) for bringing about needed changes in domestic 
legal systems. For example, we may need new legislation to protect 
genetic privacy. If there are impediments to particular states enacting 
such laws, then perhaps international law should spur change via the 
complementarity principle (according to which individual states 
have first priority for prosecuting a given international crime as long 
as the conduct is criminalized under their own laws). 
Our second question deals with corporate responsibility. Does the 
intersection of bioethics and international law force us to re-evaluate 
whether or not corporations should be held criminally liable? This 
overlaps with the third option: if the harms identified in the literature 
survey change our understanding of corporate criminal liability, the 
international law might be the necessary tool for encouraging 
domestic states to accept a (limited, contextual, and tightly 
circumscribed) form of corporate criminal liability. 
Let us first consider whether some wrongs identified by 
contemporary bioethics fall under existing laws when properly 
interpreted. 
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2 The Interpretive Approach 
Negri identifies the rise of a `darker side of transplant practice’ 
involving illegal organ trafficking and transplant tourism that has 
`infiltrate[ed] medical practice globally’ and perhaps affects ten per 
cent of all transplants.5 Negri argues that international organ 
trafficking in some cases qualifies as a crime against humanity. Her 
‘interpretive’ approach is one useful lens for analysing the 
intersection of bioethics and international criminal law, since it 
could expand the scope of existing law. She also argues that this 
crime implicates not only individuals, but entire health systems and 
corporations. 
Negri observes that the removal of organs as the purpose for 
trafficking explicitly counts as exploitation in many international 
instruments such as the ‘Additional Protocol to the Palermo 
Convention [United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime] (Article 3), the Council of Europe Convention on 
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (Article 4), and the EU 
Directive 2011/36 on Combating and Preventing Trafficking in 
Human Beings (Article 2)’.6 Note that General Assembly Resolution 
59/156 (2004) `encouraged Member States to exchange experience 
in and information on preventing, combating and punishing the illicit 
removal of and trafficking in human organs’. Negri also explains that 
non-consensual removal of organs falls under: 
Article 8, para. 2.a.(ii) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Statute, as constituting grave violation of the four Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and by para. 2.c.(i) as serious 
violation of common Article 3 concerning non-international 
armed conflicts. In fact, Article 13 of the III Geneva Convention 
and Article 32 of the IV Geneva Convention, as well as their 
common Article 3, enunciate the prohibition on mutilations and 
medical experiments as amounting to the crimes of torture and 
inhuman treatment. The prohibition on mutilation is integrated 
																																								 																				
5 Stefania Negri, ‘Transplant Ethics and the International Crime of Organ Trafficking’. 
International Criminal Law Review 16(2) (2016) 288. 
6 Negri, supra note 5, p. 298. 
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by Article 11 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which 
expressly forbids the removal of tissue or organs for 
transplantation purposes.7 
 
However, the ICC’s role in this context is conditional, requiring the 
existence of an armed conflict. 
Negri answers this limitation by arguing that outside of armed 
conflicts, organ trafficking can be treated as a crime against 
humanity even though it is not explicitly covered by ICC Statute. 
Trafficking organs and harvesting from unwilling donors amounts to 
torture and inhumane acts. If so, trafficking should be covered by 
Article 7 of the Statute. It would then fall under ICC jurisdiction.8 
The European Court of Human Rights recently made a similar 
interpretive ruling in Elberte v. Latvia. Tissue was removed from a 
deceased man’s body and sent to a pharmaceutical company in 
Germany. His wife had no knowledge of this and did not consent. 
The Court found violations of Article 8 (right for respect to private 
and family life) and Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading 
treatment).9 
The analysis of this specific case also bears on the general 
question of corporate criminal liability. ‘[S]ince trafficking in 
human organs cannot occur without some form of involvement of 
the medical or public health institutions, the Convention [Council of 
Europe Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs] also 
establishes corporate liability for these offences’.10 We return to this 
issue in the final section. 
This interpretive approach could be used to categorize new forms 
of harm made possible by genetics, biotechnology, and medical 
advances into existing international criminal law. It can be a model 
for future work. Let us now consider harms that may call for new 
international criminal laws. 
																																								 																				
7 Negri, supra note 5, p. 302. 
8 Ibid., p. 302. 
9 Elberte v. Latvia (Application no. 61243/08) [2015] ECHR 1. 
10 Negri, supra note 5, p. 299. 
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3 Wrongs that May Demand New International Laws 
Sharing of genetic data offers the possibility of tremendous 
benefits and the risk of substantial harms. The law can augment the 
former and constrain the latter. We consider both biobanks and 
forensic DNA databases. 
Biobanks collect and store biological samples and data. These are 
then used by the biobank for research or distributed to researchers 
elsewhere. The research is open-ended. Collected material may 
eventually be used for unforeseen purposes. According to Rothstein, 
Knoppers, and Harrell, ‘[i]t is this indeterminate nature of the future 
research that raises many of the distinct ethical, legal, and policy 
implications of biobanking. The issues are further magnified and 
complicated by the increasing international sharing of data derived 
from such resources’.11 Thorogood and Zawati argue that ‘biobanks 
attract a surprising range of overlapping national and international 
norms, on human rights, data protection, biomedical ethics, research 
ethics, genetics, and biobanks’.12 Data sharing of biobanks intersects 
with human rights in at least two ways. Positively, there is the human 
right to share in the benefits of medical research. Negatively, 
autonomy and genetic privacy require protections that might limit 
biobank practices. 
The World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki, which 
contains principles for protecting privacy and confidentiality of 
research subject data, was modified in 2008 to include ‘research on 
identifiable human tissue and identifiable data,’ ‘thereby drawing 
genomic biobanks within its ambit’.13 The WMA Declaration of 
Taipei on Ethical Considerations regarding Health Databases and 
Biobanks (2002) addresses the ethical collection, storage, and use of 
health information and biological material.14 ‘The UNESCO 
declarations require consent for the use or disclosure of ‘personal 
																																								 																				
11 Mark A. Rothstein, Bartha Maria Knoppers, and Heather L. Harrell. ‘Comparative 
Approaches to Biobanks and Privacy’, The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 44(1) 
(2016) 161-172.  
12 Adrian Thorogood and Ma'N H. Zawati. ‘International Guidelines for Privacy in 
Genomic Biobanking (or the Unexpected Virtue of Pluralism)’, The Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics 43(4) (2015) 690-702. 
13 Ibid., p. 693. 
14 World Medical Association, Declaration on Ethical Considerations regarding Health 
Databases (2002), Article 4,  <http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/ d1/> 
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information’ as well as for ‘genetic data’’.15 
However, Thorogood and Zawati identify forces threatening the 
privacy of the information held by biobanks. The amount of 
information being stored and shared is increasing because the costs 
of genetic sequencing and data storage are dropping. Biobanks are 
`increasingly being used as ‘universal research infrastructures’ 
accessed for broad, future uses by researchers from various fields, 
sectors, and nations’. The scale of individual biobanks and the 
networking links between them are increasing in order to ‘achieve 
the sample sizes needed to explore the complex causes of common 
diseases’.16 
Rothstein, Knoppers, and Harrell argue that such threats to 
privacy, and surprisingly also threats to data sharing, raise human 
rights issues. They outlines how the Global Alliance for Genomics 
and Health’s Framework for Responsible Sharing of Genomic and 
Health-Related Data ‘considers data sharing to be founded not only 
on bioethical norms, but on two ‘actionable’ human rights found in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (art. 27) and 
made legally binding in countries in the 1966 International Covenant 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 15)’.17 These 
actionable human rights are for all humans to benefit from medical 
research (requiring genetic data from as wide a sample of humanity 
as possible) and the right of scientists to be recognized for their 
contributions. The statement concludes that when persons consent to 
data sharing, these rights should be safeguarded. It also argues for a 
proportional approach to privacy safeguards. Policies safeguarding 
against risks of potential re-identification of genetic samples and 
data should be proportional to the realistic (not merely hypothetical) 
likelihood of breaches.18 
The positive human rights aspect deals with giving all of 
humanity the possibility of benefitting from medical research. ‘The 
lack of international regulatory harmonization has been shown to 
impede data sharing for translational research in genomics and 
																																								 																				
15 Thorogood and Zawati supra note 12, p. 694. 
16 Ibid., p. 690. 
17 Rothstein et al., supra note 11, p. 170. 
18 Ibid. 
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related fields’.19 That provides a welfarist basis to increase 
harmonization and sharing. There are also human rights reasons:  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the legally 
binding International Covenant of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1966) outline the right of all citizens to the 
benefits of science, the right to be recognized for one’s 
intellectual contribution, and the right to scientific freedom. The 
UDHGHR [Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights] and IDHGD [International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data] insist that states and researchers promote 
international cooperation and data sharing, particularly between 
industrialized and developing countries.20 
 
Regarding the negative human rights aspect, ‘[a]n individual’s right 
to be free from arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy is a 
firmly established human right. The United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states: ‘No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary interference with his privacy’’. 21 The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) codify this right. But 
the distinction between permissible and arbitrary interference is 
unclear.22 In this context, forensic DNA databases pose a threat. 
They raise similar issues as biobanks as well as worries about civil 
liberties, equal treatment, and presumption of innocence. For 
example, the European Court of Human Rights found that the United 
Kingdom’s forensic DNA database violated privacy rights 
guaranteed by the European Convention. `The European Court was 
especially troubled by the indefinite retention of genetic information 
taken from children and adults who were never convicted of a crime, 
stigmatizing them as if they were convicted criminals.’ The court 
found that this ` disregards the presumption of innocence accorded to 
																																								 																				
19 Mark A. Rothstein and Bartha Maria Knoppers. ‘INTRODUCTION: Harmonizing 
Privacy Laws to Enable International Biobank Research’. The Journal of Law, Medicine 
& Ethics 43(4) (2015) 673. 
20 Thorogood, and Zawati supra note 12, p.697. 
21 Thorogood and Zawati supra note 12, p. 692. 
22 Ibid. 
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citizens in a democracy’.23  
The sharing of DNA databases (and many other types of 
information) in Europe enabled by the Prüm Convention (2005) 
raises further issues. The convention deals with cross-border sharing 
of DNA, vehicle registration, fingerprint, and other data. However, 
national legal protections of DNA storage and analysis, and data 
protection standards, vary across countries that participate in the 
Convention.24 `[D]ata are managed according to the laws of the 
country where the data are at any given moment. Data used in 
Norway may have been collected according to laws from elsewhere; 
data gathered in Norway may wind up being stored and used 
elsewhere according to laws Norwegians have little knowledge of or 
influence over.’25 Constraints are only present when data enter the 
system, and nations vary on permissible rationales for entering data. 
Once genetic information is in the system, it is fair game throughout 
regardless of how or why it was obtained. 
Biobanks rely on consent, forensic DNA databases do not. If a 
forensic DNA database is used for new research purposes, those on 
the database cannot withdraw consent, since it was never given.26 
‘[E]ven though ‘participation’ is non-voluntary, or perhaps all the 
more so when participation is non-voluntary, issues of trust and 
transparency become important in relationship to forensic DNA 
databases’.27 Concerns of autonomy, confidentiality, equality, and 
fair treatment (racial profiling, presumption of innocence) all bear 
on that debate. ‘Retention of samples requires that we not only trust 
the government today, but also that of tomorrow (since we do not 
know what will be doable with the genetic material in the future). 
																																								 																				
23 D. Roberts, `Collateral Consequences, Genetic Surveillance and the New Biopolitics of 
Race’. Howard LJ 54 (2010) 567 (577); see S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at 30562 (2008). 
24 Eric Töpfer, `Searching for Needles in an ever expanding haystack: Cross-border DNA 
exchange in the wake of the Prüm Treaty’, Statewatch Bulletin 18(3) (July-September 
2008). 
25 Johanne Yttri Dahl and Ann Rudinow Sætnan. ``It all happened so slowly’–On 
controlling function creep in forensic DNA databases’, International Journal of Law, 
Crime and Justice 37(3) (2009) 83-103, at 97. 
26 Dahl and Sætnan supra note 25, p. 97. 
27 Ibid., see also R. Williams, P. Johnson, Genetic Policing: The Use of DNA in Criminal 
Investigations (Willan Publishing, London , 2008). 
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The possibility of data-sharing across borders requires further that 
we trust other governments over whom we hold no democratic 
sway’.28 As we will see in the next section, we may hold a different 
kind of sway via the international criminal law and the 
complementarity principle. 
Forensic databases also raise social worries that transcend harms 
to individuals. ‘Familial searching, for instance, may confront 
citizens, with previously unknown family ties. The use of ethnic 
inference borders on the ethically dubious practice of racial 
targeting’.29 If persons are only added to the forensic DNA database 
upon arrest or conviction, and there is racial disparity in arrest and 
conviction rates, then forensic DNA databases amplify racial 
disparities in criminal justice. 
Contra the European Court ruling against the United Kingdom, 
Kaye argues that we protect privacy and ensure fair treatment by 
having everyone in the database. We ought to replace forensic DNA 
databases with tightly controlled universal databases that are not 
administered by the criminal justice system. This counteracts 
discrimination in the composition of the database and changes 
society’s attitudes towards the risks of abuse. `[I]ncluding every 
citizen’s profile avoids the public attitude that the system is for 
‘them,’ not ‘us,’ and hence that abuses will affect only criminals, not 
the rest of us. As a result, it would force the legislative and executive 
branches to take the greatest care in fashioning and implementing 
the system so as to protect privacy.’30  
The need to keep forensic DNA database private is not merely 
hypothetical. Corporations have exploited forensic databases 
without individual consent. ‘According to Genewatch research has 
already taken place on the NDNAD. This research has ranged from 
studying the efficiency of the database and the validity of its 
statistics to developing new commercial products. Research has used 
both the DNA profiles from the database and the stored DNA 
samples’.31 Addressing these issues may require stronger treaties.  
																																								 																				
28 Dahl and Sætnan supra note 25, p. 99. 
29 Ibid., p. 101. 
30 David H Kaye, ‘Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement’, Brooklyn 
Law Review 67 (2001): 179. 
31 Dahl and Sætnan supra note 25, p. 99; see GeneWatch, 2006a,`The DNA Expansion 
Programme: reporting real achievements’, online at http://www.genewatch.org/uploads/ 
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Cloning and genetic engineering also may require new 
international constraints. Annas, Andrews, and Isasi call for the 
international criminalization of initiation of a pregnancy for cloning 
purposes and initiation of pregnancy using genetically-altered 
embryos.32 They argue that this should be accomplished by a treaty 
that takes a human rights perspective. Existing laws are being 
outpaced by the technology, while existing conventions do not 
clearly ban reproductive cloning and germ line interventions, are 
ambiguous, and lack clear sanctions. They conclude this 
criminalization ought not (only) be achieved through the interpretive 
approach towards crimes against humanity but through new 
transnational laws.33 
We have introduced some contemporary challenges in the 
intersection of bioethics and international criminal law. We 
considered two reasons that bioethics should play a greater role in 
international criminal law: the interpretive approach and the 
argument that bioethics identifies entirely new wrongs that demand 
new laws. According to both views, there are strong reasons to think 
many of these harms implicate institutions and corporations. Let us 
examine how the international law and norm projection might help 
us constrain those harms, as well as re-evaluate the question of 
corporate criminal liability. This will also let us explore the third 
reason that bioethics might need to play a stronger role in 
international law---that it is a necessary means to spur needed 
changes to the various systems of domestic law. 
 
4 Norm Projection, Corporations, and Criminal Liability 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that ‘[c]rimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
																																								 																				
f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/DNAexpansion_brief_final.pdf.  
32 George J. Annas, Lori B. Andrews, and Rosario M. Isasi, ‘Protecting the endangered 
human: Toward an international treaty prohibiting cloning and inheritable alterations’, 
Am. JL & Med. 28 (2002):151. 
33`[W]hile we believe these crimes should be subject to the jurisdiction of the international 
criminal court, this may not be possible in the near future, and it is more important to 
establish them as international crimes than to broaden the definition of ‘crimes against 
humanity’ as it applies to the international criminal court at this time.’ (ibid., p.157.) 
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entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes 
can the provisions of international law be enforced’.34 Such 
punishment is necessary, but is it sufficient?35 Perhaps holding 
corporations to account is also required.  
Corporations are not explicitly held liable under international 
criminal law. They are under some domestic systems of law, not 
others. The United States’ history of corporate criminal liability 
originates in New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United 
States. Also, the United States’ Alien Tort Statute allows foreigners 
to bring charges in US courts for human rights violations committed 
anywhere. Australia enacted laws with universal jurisdiction over 
natural and legal persons engaged in war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, or genocide. ‘Interestingly, the international offences 
inserted into Australian law came about as a result of Australia’s 
ratification of the ICC Statute and for the explicit purpose of 
empowering Australia to take full advantage of the principle of 
complementarity, in a context of federal criminal law that does not 
distinguish between corporate and natural persons’.36 Kyriakakis 
outlines how Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom have done likewise. ‘However, without the potential 
																																								 																				
34 See `Judicial Decisions: International Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 
Oct. 1, 1946’, 41 AM.J. IN'L L. 172 (1947). 
35 The IMT and ICC reference corporate entities but do not make them directly liable. 
`There shall be established after consultation with the Control Council for Germany an 
International Military Tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses have no 
particular geographical location whether they be accused individually or in their capacity 
as members of the organizations or groups or in both capacities.’ (Article 1 “London 
Agreement” Charter of the International Military Tribunal); `The Tribunal established by 
the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major 
war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish 
persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as 
individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes’ 
(Article 6 Charter of the International Military Tribunal); `For the purpose of paragraph 
1, an attack directed against any civilian population means a course of conduct involving 
the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack’ 
(Article 7 (2) ICC Statute (Crimes against humanity)); See also Cassese, `Crimes against 
Humanity’ in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2 
vols), A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. Jones (eds), Oxford, 2002, p. 356-357; see also ILC 
Commentary 18, Draft Code 1996. 
36 Joanna Kyriakakis, `Corporations and the international criminal court: the 
complementarity objection stripped bare’. Criminal Law Forum 19(1) (2008) 115-151 at 
p. 147. 
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compulsion to surrender corporate offenders to the ICC whether 
these laws will be applied remains to be seen’.37 
The ICC has jurisdiction only over natural persons. The variety 
of domestic approaches to this issue shows how far we are from 
consensus, making the ICC position sensible. However, perhaps the 
intersection of bioethics and the international criminal law, and the 
evidence that corporations are commonly involved (or would be 
involved) in the types of wrongs introduced in the first three 
sections, require us to revisit the issue of corporate criminal liability. 
I will argue this is the case and offer a tentative response to the 
problem that should be investigated further.  
Let us first look at the issue of corporate criminal liability in 
general, with no concern for bioethics, and then consider how 
contemporary challenges in bioethics and international law might 
change the debate. Slye gives several arguments that corporations 
should be subject to international criminal liability. The first is 
simply that the arguments for holding sovereign states criminally 
liable apply to corporations. Second is that since corporations enjoy 
rights under international law (including human rights treaties), and 
they are already subject to international liability, they should be 
subject to international criminal law. ‘It would be illogical to grant 
corporations rights under international law, including international 
human rights law, while simultaneously allowing them to avoid 
responsibility for the most egregious violations of that same body of 
law’.38 
One could object that since individuals can already be called to 
account for violations of international criminal law, responsibility is 
not avoidable. Individual state and corporate actors can be held 
responsible and punished without holding corporations themselves 
criminally liable. However, Slye argues that corporate structures can 
interfere with this form of holding to account.  
 
(1) collective action is likely to result in greater harm than 
																																								 																				
37 Ibid., p. 148. 
38 Ronald C. Slye, ‘Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability’, Brook. J. Int'l 
L. 33 (2007) 955, at 959. 
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individual action; (2) the individual actions of each corporate 
employee may be insufficient to hold any one of them liable 
under international law, even though a wrong has clearly been 
committed; and (3) effective deterrence of collective actions 
requires systemic punishment.39  
 
Likewise, Stephens argues that the multinational scope of 
corporations, which wield tremendous economic and political 
power, cannot be controlled by the national scope of legal systems. 
‘Multinational corporations have long outgrown the legal structures 
to govern them, reaching a level of transnationality and economic 
power that exceeds domestic law’s ability to impose basic human 
rights norms’.40 These arguments provide prima facie, defeasible 
reasons for the transnational criminal law (and perhaps also the 
international criminal law sensu stricto) to hold corporations 
criminally liable. 
New and potential harms involving medical and biotechnology 
demand some pre-emptive constraint. For example, forensic DNA 
databases raise a genie-out-of-the-bottle risk---once a particular 
forensic practice becomes common it is much more difficult to 
constrain.41 The wrongs identified in the first two sections are urgent 
issues for both domestic and international criminal law, and they 
potentially strengthen the case for corporate criminal liability. The 
power of modern molecular biology is corporate, either through 
corporations, universities, or governments. Biobanks, human 
engineering, reproductive cloning, and forensic DNA databases can 
cause significant harms and are enabled by corporations. ‘In addition 
to wielding enormous economic power, corporations increasingly 
engage in state-like activity as a result of the privatization of 
traditional state functions (e.g., the management of prisons, public 
welfare programs, public utilities, and wars) and the tendency of 
corporations to elect to operate in environments where state power 
is weak or non-existent’.42 State and corporate power are especially 
intertwined in the harms identified in the first three sections. 
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16	
We can supplement this with a pragmatic argument to address the 
economic disincentives for bioethics regulation. ‘An argument 
against home state (and in fact the enforcement of host state) 
regulation is that it will create a commercial disadvantage to those 
states that do chose to regulate’.43 If international law can create 
more uniformity this can counter the commercial disadvantage of 
strong constraints. This is an example of the third rationale for an 
increasing role of bioethics in the international criminal law---it 
could be an effective tool (or the necessary tool) for bringing about 
needed changes in domestic legal systems. The international 
criminal law can create a level playing field with stronger constraints 
than domestic legal systems would provide. ‘Indeed the ICC 
mechanism particularly commends itself as the complementarity 
model encourages the application of existing national criminal 
legislation, as well as serving as a means for states to politically 
divest their responsibility for the act. They have the ability to say, 
we either do this, or the ICC will’.44 A state having comparatively 
strong laws guarding, say, genetic privacy may encourage 
companies to invest elsewhere. This incentivizes having weaker 
laws. If international law can create more harmony among the 
various domestic systems, then those incentives can perhaps be 
mitigated. The point is generalizable: if there are strong moral 
reasons to criminalize some behaviour, but also strong disincentives 
for a state to have more robust constraints on that behaviour than 
other states, then the international law could be a useful tool for 
setting minimal standards for domestic constraints on that 
behaviour. I will now explain how Luban’s conception of norm 
projection bears on this issue, then consider how this relates to the 
law and literature on biobanks, and finally discuss how it might be 
extended to cover other wrongs. 
The international criminal law could encourage domestic legal 
systems to adopt specific norms about the wrongs identified in the 
first two sections. It could also encourage a norm that, in some 
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contexts, corporations should be criminally liable. Luban’s 
conception of the essential function of the international criminal law 
can provide resources to address both problems in the paper: the lack 
of regulation of new types of harms and the lack of corporate 
criminal liability.  
[I]nternational judicial institutions can nudge the political 
system; once created, they can speak law to power. Speaking 
law to power is, in my view, the major point of [international 
criminal justice]. Its mode of functioning is expressive, and its 
aim is norm projection, the dissemination through trials, 
punishments and jurisprudence of a set of norms very different 
from the Machiavellian brutality of the past.45  
 
The function of international criminal law is to project norms onto 
domestic legal systems, onto institutions, onto individuals. The 
mode of its functioning is expressive: the law, trials, and 
punishments convey judgments and affirm norms. Via expressivism, 
the international criminal law can change norms, behaviours, and the 
criminal law in particular states. This is facilitated by the 
complementarity principle, which gives individual states the first 
priority for prosecuting a given international crime as long as the 
conduct is criminalized under their own laws. The ICC plays only a 
complementary role. 
Viewed in light of an expressive vision of international criminal 
law as an instrument of moral transformation, perhaps its single 
most important achievement has been the complementarity built 
into the ICC’s institutional design. To avail themselves of 
complementarity, states must revise their own criminal codes to 
mirror the substantive law of the Rome Statute. As they do so, 
new norms get spliced into the DNA of domestic law. That is 
norm projection at work. It matters as much, or even more, for 
changing political imagination than a handful of international 
trials.46  
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Even if complementarity only generates domestic laws that rarely 
lead to trials, there still is a payoff, since ‘[e]ven an under-enforced 
domestic law against war crimes can be effective if it becomes part 
of military training.’47 Perhaps the international criminal law could 
be similarly effective for constraining biotech firms, healthcare 
systems, forensic DNA databases, and biobanks. 
However, one might accept Luban’s view of the purpose of 
international criminal law, be convinced that it should somehow 
address the wrongs identified in the first two sections, yet doubt that 
the norm of corporate criminal liability should be projected. 
Corporate criminal liability is controversial. Different states share 
norms about specific harms yet disagree on the necessary means to 
address those harms. Different legal systems exhibit conflicting 
stances on whether the criminal law should only hold individual 
corporate actors responsible or also hold corporations responsible. 
There is reasonable disagreement over whether corporations should 
be subject to criminal liability. Perhaps norm projection should be 
restricted to whatever is outside the scope of reasonable 
disagreement? If so, and if bioethics’ relationship to the international 
law does not change our understanding the problem of corporate 
criminal liability, then the international criminal law should continue 
to apply only to natural persons. We consider the following 
arguments against international corporate criminal liability: that it 
violates the complementarity principle and that it is a category 
mistake to ascribe responsibility to corporations. 
Kyriakakis simplifies the various forms of the complementarity 
objection to the following basic worry. The ICC preferences national 
jurisdictions. Whenever possible, the ICC will have a domestic legal 
system prosecute. If the ICC holds corporations to account, it would 
undermine the complementarity relationship between the ICC and 
the various domestic legal systems. That is because so many states 
do not recognize corporate criminal liability, therefore they would 
forfeit their normal right to prosecute to the ICC.48 Frulli emphasizes 
the lack of uniformity among different national systems on this 
																																								 																				
47Ibid. 
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issue.49 Wexler thinks this lack of uniformity makes the 
implementation of international corporate criminal liability 
‘practically difficult’.50  
Luban’s account of norm projection can help us answer these 
objections. No state is automatically and permanently unable to 
assert their right to prosecute corporations. They are only unable if 
they resist the norm being projected by the international law. This is 
the force of norm projection—to take advantage of complementarity 
in some domain, a state’s domestic law must map onto international 
law. Any state can do this. Note that if international criminal law 
changed to hold corporations criminally liable, it would only be for 
a very limited number of wrongs. The complementarity principle 
would generate pressure for domestic legal systems to create 
corporate criminal liability only for those wrongs that are covered 
by international criminal law. Therefore, the worry about 
complementarity reduces to the problem of the domain of 
appropriate norm projection. If the intersection of bioethics and 
international criminal law provides nothing new to the topic of 
corporate criminal liability, it is likely still not an appropriate norm 
to project. If the problems found in that intersection push us to 
endorse corporate criminal liability, it may be an appropriate norm 
to project. 
The issue of corporate responsibility in this context reveals fault 
lines in two different conceptions of the function of international 
criminal law. Luban argues that the role of international criminal 
justice is norm projection. Punishment is merely a means to that, and 
is a minor contributor to the international criminal law’s ability to 
project norms. A quite different conception is found in Hasnas’ 
argument that ‘[c]riminal law is penal law. Its purpose is 
punishment. It is not designed to compose disputes, provide 
compensation to wronged parties, or impose administrative 
sanctions. It is designed to punish’.51 Hasnas’ view is that the 
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criminal law’s punishments have intrinsic value, and his conception 
of justifiable punishment is based in desert. ‘Criminal law’s punitive 
purpose limits the range of application of its sanction to those 
persons and entities that can be deserving of punishment---to those 
capable of acting in a morally blameworthy way’.52 Children, 
incompetents, and the insane are excluded because they are 
incapable deserving such punishment. Corporations are excluded for 
the same reason. 
That leads us directly to the category error objection. The 
category mistake objection assumes that an entity can be criminally 
responsible only if it can be morally responsible. Since corporations 
cannot be morally responsible (in virtue of lacking the capacities that 
make humans morally responsible), they cannot be criminally 
responsible. Treating them as such is a category mistake. Hasnas 
provides a useful summary of various attempts to establish that 
corporations can be morally responsible because they possess 
characteristics that make us morally responsible.53 French argues 
that corporations’ internal decision structures enable them to act 
intentionally.54 They are capable of being `full-fledged moral 
persons’ responsible for their actions. Thomas Donaldson provides 
a similar but less bold view that corporations can use moral reasons 
in decision making and therefore can be responsible for their 
actions.55 Patricia Werhane argues that corporations are authors of 
some actions carried out by their agents and representatives and are 
therefore morally responsible for such actions.56 Michael J. Phillips 
argues that corporations make possible some actions that no natural 
person could cause or intend or be negligent with respect to, 
therefore they should be considered responsible for those actions.57 
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Hasnas contrasts that family of views with the position that it is 
‘logically incoherent to attribute moral responsibility to 
corporations’.58 If corporations cannot be morally responsible in the 
way natural persons are, they cannot be held criminally liable. 
Corporations can be regulated and held civilly liable, but it is 
incoherent to hold them criminally liable given Hasnas’ view that 
the primary function of criminal law is to give deserved punishment. 
He, rightly in my view, cites Velasquez as providing the strongest 
incoherence objection.59 Velasquez starts with the premise that 
criminal liability requires moral responsibility, and moral 
responsibility only applies to intentional acts of agents. He then 
argues that corporations are not agents, they do not act intentionally, 
they are incapable of feeling the shame and suffering of punishment, 
and they are not causally responsible for the acts of their employees. 
Since this all entails corporations are not morally responsible, they 
are not directly subject to criminal liability. Individual corporate 
actors are the proper concern of criminal justice. They act 
intentionally. They are causally responsible for what corporations 
do. Combined with Hasnas’ view of the primary purpose of criminal 
law as punishment, this means that corporations are outside the 
domain of criminal law. 
I will not directly attack the incoherence arguments of Hasnas and 
Velasquez or argue that corporations are capable of being morally 
responsible in the same way as natural persons. I will instead reply 
by analysing the nature of responsibility, the reasons for and against 
holding particular kinds of entities responsible, and how the wrongs 
discussed in the first few sections should inform our thinking on 
these matters. 
 The argument against holding parties responsible without 
warrant seems to rest on the premise that this wrongs them and the 
premise that moral responsibility is a necessary condition for 
deserved punishment. These are linked; it wrongs them because they 
are not morally responsible. The harms of punishment are 
underserved on that basis. The underserving entities Hasnas cites 
(children, the incapacitated, the insane) would be wronged by the 
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underserved suffering caused by punishment and by the false 
judgment of culpability expressed by the punishment. Now, what 
possible wrong is there in holding corporations responsible? The 
harms involved are fines or other penalties. This is the same as civil 
penalties for corporations, which are far less controversial. Even if 
corporations cannot genuinely deserve criminal punishment, if those 
punishments amount to fines and other penalties already accepted 
within civil liability, why not be purely consequentialist about 
corporate criminal liability? Corporate criminal liability is not a 
matter of incarcerating or otherwise causing suffering to a conscious 
entity. Corporations cannot experience suffering any more than they 
can be morally responsible on the Hasnas/Velasquez view; only 
individual corporate actors can experience the suffering of 
punishment. This weakens the analogy to wrongly holding human 
beings criminally liable and makes it dubious to lump corporations 
with children, the incapacitated, and the insane. When it comes to 
legal rather than natural persons, we can be more straightforwardly 
consequentialist about punishment in ways that we ought not be for 
persons who can suffer. Even if there is some form of logical 
incoherence in holding corporations criminally liable, if there is no 
wrong, the question is then whether corporate responsibility is a 
useful fiction. Are good consequences generated by holding 
corporations criminally liable?  
Now, one could grant that punishing a corporation despite its lack 
of moral responsibility does not wrong it, but that it does wrong 
shareholders, who can experience suffering. Hasnas argues it is as 
incoherent to punish shareholders as corporations. The function of 
criminal law is punishment, and punishing shareholders is 
incoherent both in terms of retribution and deterrence. 
The defining characteristic of the modern corporation is the 
separation of ownership and control. The shareholders, who 
own the corporation, have no direct control over or knowledge 
of the behavior of the corporate employees who commit 
criminal offenses. Hence, inflicting punishment on a 
corporation's shareholders is punishing those who are 
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personally innocent of wrongdoing for the offenses of others.60 
 
 On Hasnas’ view, punishing a corporation punishes its 
shareholders, but this is incoherent on a retributive basis and 
impermissible on a deterrence basis. Retributive rationales for 
punishment make no sense, since shareholders lack control and 
knowledge of the behaviour of employees who break the law, and 
are therefore not morally responsible for what the corporation does. 
In terms of deterrence, he does not deny that punishing shareholders 
could deter corporate malfeasance. Rather, he argues that deterrence 
has limits, and punishing those who are undeserving in virtue of not 
being morally responsible is unacceptable.  
Yet we already do the equivalent to shareholders via regulation 
and civil penalties. What is the difference if we do so via criminal 
penalties? The separation of ownership and control cited by Hasnas 
can be taken as a reason to think the expressivist content of corporate 
punishment does not trickle down to shareholders and therefore does 
not wrong them. Treating the corporation as responsible does not 
entail always judging shareholders responsible because of the 
separation of ownership and control as well as the shareholders’ 
limited access to information about corporate policies and 
deliberations. If the judgment expressed by a criminal corporate 
punishment ever attaches to shareholders it must be in virtue of 
intentionally supporting the corporation’s criminal conduct or 
having enough shares to exert control. A criminal punishment for a 
corporation expresses judgments that cannot trickle down to 
shareholders who have ownership solely in virtue of investing 
through passive, broad-based stock index funds that track entire 
markets or in virtue of choosing amongst a very limited number of 
active mutual funds in one’s retirement plan. 
If the judgments expressed in corporate criminal punishments do 
not apply to shareholders, then even though they can be harmed by 
corporate punishment, there is no incoherent retributivist 
component. They can be harmed by the punishment in terms of 
falling share price, but they are not wronged. All sorts of criminal 
punishments exhibit such collateral damage. The shareholders are 
not wronged, so the punishment can be understood solely in terms 
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of deterring corporate malfeasance. Perhaps we need the ICC and 
the complementarity principle to achieve forceful constraint of the 
bioethics wrongs identified in the first two sections. If this is all a 
matter of shaping corporate behaviour, there is nothing incoherent 
or immoral in subjecting shareholders to the same harms that can 
stem from regulation and civil penalties. Holding a natural person 
responsible when they are not, and punishing them without warrant, 
wrongs them because they experience undeserved, intentionally 
inflicted suffering and the punishment expresses a false judgment 
about their responsibility. But shareholders are merely harmed by 
corporate punishment, not themselves punished or wronged. An 
error in holding a natural person to account is one thing, since the 
punishment can cause suffering they do not deserve. But by the 
internal logic of the corporate category mistake, even if 
responsibility ascriptions and punishments are unwarranted for 
corporations, there is no undeserved suffering analogue. Why not be 
pure consequentialists about corporate criminal liability? 
We can also transcend this dispute over the logical coherence of 
whether corporate criminal liability requires the capacity to be 
morally responsible in the way Strawson tries to transcend the 
dispute over whether free will and moral responsibility rely on a 
compatibilist or incompatibilist account of human agency.61 
Compatibilists believe free will can exist in an entirely deterministic 
causal system, incompatibilists do not. The existence of free will, 
then, hinges on whether human action occurs in a deterministic or 
indeterministic system. Strawson rejects this picture and argues that 
moral responsibility is not justified by any particular metaphysical 
conception of free will. When confronted with a specific action, we 
can take either the reactive stance or the objective stance towards the 
person. The reactive stance is the normal stance we take towards 
other competent human beings and involves such ‘reactive attitudes’ 
as resentment and gratitude. The objective stance is what we take 
towards Hasnas’ examples of those who cannot be fully responsible: 
children, incompetents, the insane. Which stance we take depends 
on factors other than the metaphysical account of the behaviour’s 
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ultimate causal origins. Rather, Strawson argues that it is warranted 
to treat normal human agents as responsible for three reasons. First, 
to treat nobody as responsible would be to take the objective stance 
universally. Then the distinction between the behaviour of normal 
agents and incapacitated agents would no longer make sense, nor 
would the distinction between the behaviour of free agents and 
coerced agents. If so, that is a reductio ad absurdum of the view that 
responsibility must require some particular metaphysical conception 
of free will. Second, we are simply incapable of giving up the 
reactive stance entirely. It is inextricably bound up with our form of 
life. Third, even if we could abandon the reactive attitudes on the 
basis of a metaphysical argument about the lack of free will, the form 
of human life in which we see ourselves and each other as 
responsible is more valuable than a form of human life in which we 
do not.  
We can apply the same reasoning to corporations and ask 
ourselves, given their power and their newfound ability commit 
wrongs involving violations of genetic privacy, bodily autonomy, 
cloning, organ trafficking, and germ-line engineering, are we going 
to be better off taking the reactive or objective stance? This 
Strawsonian approach to the issue has been mostly ignored in the 
literature. David Silver provides a notable exception, though he is 
focused on justifying ascriptions of moral responsibility to 
corporations, not with criminal liability.62  
Consider our linguistic habits, our criticism of corporate 
malfeasance, the various divestment campaigns---do we not already 
take the reactive stance to corporations? Recall that contemporary 
medical and biotechnology makes it possible to internationally 
wrong someone without physically crossing the border of the nation 
or the body. Corporations can redefine what we are through 
engineering and reproductive cloning. If our lives will be better if 
we treat corporations as agents capable of being criminally liable, if 
it is the best way to constrain the wrongs outlined in the first two 
sections, then why not do it? This is a conditional claim, the 
antecedent of which must be studied further.  
Silver gives a Strawsonian explanation for the intelligibility of 
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holding reactive attitudes towards corporations. Our negative 
individual reactive attitudes are in response to flaws of character, 
while our negative corporate reactive attitudes are in response to 
flaws in corporate culture. If corporate culture shapes and influences 
the behaviour of individual agents within the corporation, the 
reactive attitudes are intelligible.63 By extension, if corporate 
criminal liability can change a corporate culture, then it can improve 
the behaviour of individual corporate actors. For example, a 
corporate culture that affirms human rights are always subordinate 
to profit can lead to corporate actors violating human rights. The 
reactive attitudes, when applied to corporations, might be able to 
constrain and limit such cultures and by extension improve the 
actions of the employees and directors. 
Based on the evidence in the previous section that bioethics 
identifies harms highly linked to corporations, I support this 
tentative conclusion. The question then is whether our lives will be 
better by projecting the norm of international criminal liability. This 
is an empirical question I am not able to answer here. My thesis is 
that new wrongs (and potential wrongs) identified by contemporary 
bioethics implicate corporations and force us to re-evaluate this 
issue.  
There are two ways we can be consequentialists about this. The 
first is the straightforward sense of deterring harm. Would 
international corporate criminal liability, directly and via the 
complementarity principle, help deter the wrongs identified in the 
first two sections? Do these specific sorts of wrongs change the 
analysis of the costs and benefits of corporate criminal liability? We 
should look to policy experts, law and economics, and other 
empirical disciplines to settle that matter.64 We should not be 
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concerned with the alleged logical incoherence of corporate criminal 
responsibility or worry that it wrongs anyone. Let us be strict 
consequentialists with a Strawsonian account of corporate 
responsibility. Even if it relies on a fiction, it could be a useful one.  
The second consequentialist aspect has to do with reactive 
attitudes and corporate cultures. What corporate cultures do we 
want, given the new potential wrongs identified in the earlier 
sections? Do we want corporate cultures that see each individual’s 
genetic information as a resource to be exploited regardless of their 
consent or risks to their welfare? Or cultures that see the organs of 
vulnerable persons as just another natural resource to exploit? Do we 
want corporate cultures that would make germ-line modifications 
with no concern other than profit? If not, and if corporate liability is 
the best way to constrain such cultures, that is all the reason we need. 
 
5 Conclusion 
I briefly outlined new and potential wrongs made possible by 
advances in medicine and biotechnology. There are compelling 
arguments both that some of these wrongs are already international 
crimes according to the interpretive approach and that new laws are 
required. Most of these wrongs implicate (or would implicate) 
corporations. The increasing reach and power of multinational 
corporations, amplified by the tools of genetics and biotechnology, 
is a consequence of human choice. It is not a natural fact. From a 
Strawsonian perspective, the decision whether or not to hold an 
entity responsible is determined not merely by facts but also by 
values. What life do we want to live—one in which we see ourselves 
as responsible or not? For Strawson, no metaphysical fact 
determines the issue. So too, I argue, for corporations, and also that 
the wrongs identified and predicted by contemporary bioethics must 
influence our choice. What life we want to live should be formed by 
our best evidence about the consequences of holding corporations 
responsible, not by arguments that corporations are or are not 
analogous to responsible humans. I argued that corporate criminal 
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punishment wrongs neither the corporation nor the shareholders, that 
the expressivist content of such punishment does not generally 
trickle down to shareholders, that there is no logical incoherence in 
such punishment, and that international corporate criminal liability 
does not threaten the complementarity principle. If the evidence is 
that these new and potential harms change the costs and benefits of 
holding corporations responsible, then perhaps corporate criminal 
liability is an appropriate norm to project through the international 
criminal law and the complementarity principle. 
What if a Strawsonian reactive stance is necessary to deterring 
these specific corporate harms? Kyriakakis observes that ‘it has been 
argued that punishment of the corporate entity directly, as opposed 
to individuals therein, is more likely to create lasting results’.65 
Clough argues that punishing corporations creatives incentives for 
them to monitor and improve their culture and decision-making 
processes.66 Ratner argues that corporate liability encourages 
shareholders to monitor corporate behaviour.67 With a Strawsonian 
account of responsibility we can further investigate the efficacy of 
corporate liability in light of the present and looming threats outlined 
in the first two sections. It could be a powerful tool to deter these 
wrongs and to change corporate cultures that are malignant from a 
bioethics perspective. 
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